业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?  

Does the New Performance Appraisals(EVA) Promote Innovation of Central Government-owned Enterprises(CGOEs)?

作　　者：余明桂[1] 钟慧洁[1] 范蕊[1] Yu Minggui Zhong Huijie Fan Rui(School of Economics and Management, Wuhan Universit)

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济研究》2016年第12期104-117,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372126;71502161;71572133;71672134);教育部人文社科项目(15YJA630057)的资助

摘　　要：关于国有企业是否需要进行民营化改革的问题存在两种对立的观点。一种观点认为只有民营化才能彻底解决国企效率问题,另一种观点则认为民营化不仅不能解决国企现存问题,还可能导致严重的国有资产流失。本文以2009年国资委修订的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》为切入点,研究这项不涉及民营化的央企高管业绩考核制度对企业创新的作用及经济后果。本文以此次修订为自然实验,采用双重差分法进行检验,发现相对于不受该项制度影响的民营企业来说,央企的创新水平在新政策实施后显著提高。而且,此次修订的考核办法可以显著提高创新对企业价值的边际贡献。上述检验结果意味着,国有企业即使不进行民营化的产权改革,仅仅通过改变高管的激励机制,也可以提高企业效率。因此,民营化很可能并不是解决国有企业效率问题的唯一途径。本文不仅有助于在理论上澄清关于国企民营化改革的争议,而且有助于拓展和深化企业激励机制和企业创新的相关研究。There are two different views about whether state-owned enterprises （SOEs） should be privatized. One view argues that only privatization can thoroughly solve SOEs efficiency problems. Another view suggests that privatization is hard to solve the bad performance problems of SOEs, and probably leads to serious appropriation of state-owned assets. Based on the new performance appraisal （EVA） of top management in ＂The Revision of Interim Measures for Business Performance Appraisals of Persons-in-Charge at Central Government-Owned Enterprises＂ in 2009, this paper tests the impact of the new EVA performance appraisal on CGOEs innovation. Using difference-in-differences approach, we find a significant increase of CGOEs patents after the implementation of the new EVA appraisal. We use a rich set of tests to show that the baseline results are robust to endogeneity and reverse causality. We further examine how EVA appraisal affects CGOEs Tobin＇s Q and find that the increase of patents improves CGOEs value. This paper clarifies the controversy of privatization of SOEs, and enriches literature about top management incentive mechanisms and corporate innovation.

关 键 词：企业创新 业绩考核 激励机制 代理问题 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F275