道德虚念存在吗  

Is There Moral Alief?

作　　者：张子夏[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学人文学院

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2016年第12期103-108,158-159,共6页Zhejiang Social Sciences

摘　　要：克里格尔宣称,道德哲学家可以通过在道德领域中运用甘德勒的"虚念/信念区分"来更好地理解某些悖论,比如说史密斯的"道德问题"。然而,正如这篇文章中所论证的,克里格尔设立道德虚念之存在的做法缺乏正当性。因为(1)虚念的某些本质性刻画无法被归于道德虚念,以及(2)"道德虚念/信念的区分"根本无助于解决"道德问题"。道德虚念仅仅是由"虚念是系统1唯一的产物"和"道德真理与知觉真理能被单一的真理理论解释"这两个错误观念带来的错觉。有鉴于此,我们并没有理由相信所谓"道德虚念"存在。Kriegel claims that, by applying Gendler＇s ＂alief/belief distinction＂ to the moral area, moral philosopher s could reac h a better understanding of otherwise paradoxical phenomena, e.g. Smith＇s ＂moral problem.＂ However, as it is argued in this essay, Kriegel is not justified in positing the existence of moral alief. For（1） it is not possible to attribute a couple of essential characterisations of aliefs to moral aliefs,and（2） the ＂moral alief/belief distinction＂ does not help in solving the ＂moral problem＂ at all. Moral alief is a mere illusion which stems from two misleading ideas： alief is the only product of System 1, and moral truths and perceptual truths are explained by a univocal theory of truth. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the so-called ＂moral alief＂ exists.

关 键 词：虚念 道德判断 道德问题 双进程说 克里格尔 甘德勒 

分 类 号：B82-0[哲学宗教—伦理学]