控股股东涉入与高管股权激励:“监督”还是“合谋”?  

Controlling Shareholders' Involvement and Equity Compensation:“Supervision” or “Collusion”?

作　　者：陈文强[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州310058

出　　处：《经济管理》2017年第1期114-133,共20页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"家族社会资本传承及其对家族企业代际创业的影响机理研究"(71372059)

摘　　要：本文基于我国上市公司"一股独大"的特殊制度背景,考察了控股股东涉入对股权激励效应的影响机制和作用效果。研究发现,控股股东在股权激励效应实现过程中既有监督作用,也存在合谋现象,这种异质性的作用效果受到控股股东涉入程度的影响,并在不同控股股东类型的企业中存在明显差异。具体而言,股权激励整体上具有激励作用,能显著提升企业绩效;相对于股权分散的公司,存在控股股东企业的激励效果更好,但控股股东涉入程度对股权激励效应具有负向调节作用;国有控股削弱了股权激励与企业绩效之间的正相关关系,但国有控股股东的涉入程度对股权激励效应并无显著影响,控股股东与管理层之间的合谋现象主要表现在民营企业中。进一步的研究发现,在控股股东涉入程度高的民营企业中,股权激励的实施加剧了大股东的掏空行为。本文还发现,授予激励力度更大、行权价格和条件更低、有效期更短的激励合约,是控股股东对管理层进行赎买,进而达成合谋的内在方式。Equity compensation has been viewed as an important governance mechamsm whxch can alleviate a- gency problem and enhance corporate performance. Although massive effort has been directed toward characterizing the link between equity incentive and corporate performance, empirical findings still remain inconsistent. The opti- mal contracting perspective advocated that the board can design compensation contracts exclusively for the purpose of alleviating the agency problem between shareholders and managers, thereby incentivizing managers to maximize firm value for the benefit of the shareholders. Consistent with this position, prior studies have documented a positive relation between equity incentive and firm performance. Alternatively, managerial power perspective maintained that managers may control the pay-setting process and managerial power or entrenchment can allow for rent extraction via excess compensation ,which often coincides with disappointing operating and stock performance to the detriment of the firms＇ shareholders. Based on this argument, other empirical findings have identified insignificant, or even nega-tive associations. From this paper＇ s perspective, most studies to date focus on the effect of equity incentive without considering the more fundamental context factors behind it, that is the organizational environment within which firms operate. As a key variable in modern corporate, ownership structure defines the nature of principal-agent issues and the ways corporations have been governed, which has a fundamental effect on the applicability and effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Since equity incentive is born within specific organizational environment, the effect of equity incentive is inevitably subjected to the influence of the characteristics of ownership structure. This is particularly the case in China, where listed companies are prominently characterized by a highly con- centrated ownership of shareholders. Firstly, concentrated ownership structure may lead to conflicts

关 键 词：股权激励效应 控股股东涉入 控股股东类型 倾向得分匹配法 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]