不对称信息下双渠道供应链激励机制研究  

Study on Motivation of Duo-channel Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：田雪[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流技术》2016年第12期129-134,145,共7页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：基于由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链系统,研究了不对称信息下激励机制设计问题。首先分析了对称信息下供应链处于集中和分散两种模式时的成员最优决策;其次分析了不对称信息下零售商服务水平为私人信息时制造商的激励机制设计问题,运用委托-代理理论建模,运用泛函极值理论求解;最后通过实例仿真分析,验证了激励机制对于提高供应链绩效的合理有效性。In this paper, in view a duo-channel supply chain system composed by a single manufacturer and single retailer, we studied the design of its motivation mechanism with asymmetric information. First, we analyzed the optimal decision-making of the members of the supply chain respectively under the centralized and distributive decision-making modes when the information availability was symmetric. Then we studied the design of the motivation mechanism of the manufacturer under asymmetric information access and when the service level of the retailer was private information, built the principal-agent model and solved it relying on the functional extreme theory. At the end, in connection with an empirical case, we demonstrated the validity of the motivation mechanism in improving supply chain performance.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 不对称信息 激励机制 博弈论 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224.0[经济管理—国民经济]