多重社会偏好下供应链协调研究  

Supply Chain Coordination under Multiple Social Preferences

作　　者：徐翔斌[1,2] 李恒[1] 史峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]华东交通大学交通运输与物流学院,南昌330013 [2]中南大学交通运输工程学院,长沙410083

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2017年第1期154-162,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71540039);江西省自然科学基金资助项目(20151BAB207060);华东交通大学校立课题(13JD04)

摘　　要：针对供应链主体的"非完全经济人"问题,构建了一个考虑双重社会偏好的供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,利用C&R社会偏好综合模型对供应链主体的效用建模,并采用模型和数值仿真分析了供应链主体的利他偏好和互利偏好对双方最优订购量、期望收益以及供应链整体效率的影响。研究结果表明:供应链整体收益随着零售商相互之间利他偏好的降低而增长;而零售商整体收益则随着零售商之间利他偏好的增加而增长。当处于领导地位的零售商利他偏好主导时,零售商整体收益高于分散决策供应链;而当处于供应链领导企业的互利偏好主导时,零售商整体收益低于分散决策供应链。In this paper, we develop a Stackelberg game model in which multiple social preferences are taken into account, and model the social utilities of the enterprises in the supply chain with C＆R hybrid model. The impact of both altruistic and reciprocity preference on the supply chain are analyzed. We find that the performance of the supply chain is reduced by the retailers＇ altruism and the performance of the retailers is improved by that. Furthermore, an interesting and reasonable phenomenon is discovered that, when the leading enterprisers altruistic preferences dominate, the retailers＇ profit is higher than that in decentralized supply chain, and is lower than that in decentralized supply chain when the leading enterprisers reciprocal preference dominate.

关 键 词：供应链协调 多重社会偏好 利他偏好 互利偏好 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]