公立高校的过度借贷、软预算约束及其变革——兼论化债的作用  

Over Loan,Soft Budget Constraint and its Reform in Public University——Concurrently Analyzing Function of Resolving Debt

作　　者：吴振顺[1] 廖文军[1] 常耀中[1] WU Zhenshun LIAO Wenjun CHANG Yaozhong(College of Mageuent Hunan Institute of Engineering, Xiangtan 411104, China)

机构地区：[1]湖南工程学院管理学院,湖南湘潭411104

出　　处：《湖南工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2017年第1期71-75,共5页Journal of Hunan Institute of Engineering(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：湖南省教育科学规划重点课题项目"‘后化债’时期地方本科院校财务管理目标体系的构建研究"(XJK014AGD006);湖南省重点学科建设项目资助(湘教发〔2011〕76号)

摘　　要：公立高校预算软约束制度导致了政府和银行对高校代理人的双重监督约束失灵,无论高校扩招是否停止,都会诱发高校代理人过度借贷问题,引起债务违约风险。扩招停止后预算软约束制度失去了必要性,应实施高校代理人硬预算约束制度,防范高校过度借贷现象的再次发生。Soft budget constraint leads to fail of supervision and control ot government ana oank principles public university agent, which led to over loan of university agent and risk of debt default. Whether enrollment extension of public university ends or not, the above problems will always happen under soft budget constraint. After ending enrollment extension of public university, soft budget constraint institution on public university agent loses its necessity and hard budget constraint institution should be implemented to prevent happening of over loan phenomenon once again.

关 键 词：公立高校 软预算约束 代理 化债 

分 类 号：G475-054[文化科学—教育学]