高管股权激励计划、合约特征与公司现金持有  

Executive Equity Incentive Plan,Contract Characteristics and Corporate Cash Holdings

作　　者：刘井建[1] 纪丹宁 王健 Liu Jingjian Ji Danning Wang Jian(Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology State Grid Yingda Group, China Power Finance Co., Ltd. Jiangsu Branch)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部金融与会计研究所 [2]大连理工大学管理与经济学部 [3]国网英大集团中国电力财务有限公司江苏分公司

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2017年第1期43-56,共14页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172136);中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(DUT16RW112)资助

摘　　要：为揭示现金持有是否存在代理成本及高管股权激励合约的影响效应,对我国沪深A股2009-2013年上市公司进行计量分析,实证结果表明,股权激励计划对公司现金尤其超额现金具有减持作用,合约中设置股票期权与行权约束以及持续激励的公司表现出了增强效应,但有效期和激励强度的增效作用并不显著;股权激励计划对低投资机会和低融资约束公司现金的减持作用更为显著;进一步研究发现,主要是通过抑制过度投资和超额在职消费对现金持有的增持效应。结论表明,我国上市公司现金持有存在代理成本,股权激励计划能够发挥一定的抑制效应,为公司现金管理和股权激励合约设计提供了启示。How to determine the optimal cash holding level is one of micro-finance problems. Whether the level of cash holdings isoptimal not only influences the company＇s financial risk, but also affects the effectiveness of investor protection. In order to analyze the agency problems of cash holdings and the negative effect of executive equity incentive contract on it, this paper makes use of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-category share listed companies between 2009 and 2013 to conduct econometric analysis and in doing so, reaches some conclusions. Executive equity incentive plan has neg- ative effect on corporate cash holdings, especially on excess cash holdings. Exercising constraints and constant incentives embedded in the equity incentive plan have reinforcement effect while period of validity and incentive intensity do not have. The reducing ef- fect on cash holdings for lower investment opportunities or lower financial constraint companies is more significant than the higher ones. Mediation test shows executive equity incentive plays a role of reducing cash holdings by weakening the effect of over-investment and on-duty compensation. Basically, it turns out that cash holdings contribute to agency cost. Executive equity incentive plan does reduce cash holdings to some extent and different contracts show different moderation effect. As cash holdings are potential carrier of agency costs, executive equity incentive plan has the function on optimizing the level of cash holdings, which supports the optimal contract theory of equity incentive on this perspective, that is to say, it aims at solving agency problem of cash holdings rather than pursuing personal welfare by executives. Different characteristics of executive equity incentive contracts, which are mainly designed for enforcing the effectiveness on reducing agency cost, show dif- ferent moderating effect on aligning the synergy interest between executive and shareholders. For the specific contract characteristics, features with stock option, persistent i

关 键 词：股权激励计划 现金持有 自由现金流假说 投资机会 融资约束 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]