高管薪酬倒挂与监管体系:2003～2015年A股上市公司样本  

Executive Compensation Upside Down and Regulatory System:Taking the Sample of A Share Listed Companies from 2003 to 2015 as an Example

作　　者：杜勇[1] 张欢[1] Du Yong Zhang Huan

机构地区：[1]西南大学经济管理学院,重庆400715

出　　处：《改革》2017年第2期116-125,共10页Reform

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"社会资本视域下的中国上市公司亏损逆转质量:结构特征;驱动机理与经济后果"(批准号:71572153)

摘　　要：针对我国资本市场存在的薪酬-业绩倒挂现象,将2003~2015年A股上市公司作为研究样本,分析公司盈亏状态对出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象概率的影响。实证结果发现:与盈利上市公司相比,亏损上市公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率更大;考虑到产权性质差异,民营亏损公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率比国有亏损公司更大;管理者权力较大的亏损公司出现薪酬-业绩倒挂现象的概率更大。监管部门应该重点关注亏损公司的高管薪酬激励制度的合理性。Based on the phenomenon of pay-performance upside down in China＇s capital market, using the data of the A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2015, we investigate the impact of the company＇s profit and loss on the probability of pay-performance upside down. The empirical results show that： Compared ＂with the profit enterprises, the probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the loss-making enterprises. Considering the difference of the property right, the probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the loss-making enterprises with state-owned ownership. The probability of the pay-performance upside down is higher in the loss-making enterprises with greater power of executives. Thus, we argue that regulators should focus on the rationality of the executive compensation incentive system of loss-making enterprises.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 政府监管 资本市场发展 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]