高管权力、现金股利政策及其价值效应  

Managerial Power,Cash Dividend Policy and Value Effect

作　　者：张春龙[1] 张国梁[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学工商管理学院,大连116024

出　　处：《管理评论》2017年第3期168-175,共8页Management Review

摘　　要：现金股利政策一直是学术界关注的热点问题,国内外学者多从代理角度讨论公司发放现金股利的动机,缺乏对动机实现手段的讨论。本文从我国资本市场低现金股利的现实特点出发,研究高管权力对公司现金股利政策的影响以及这种影响的价值效应。研究表明,高管权力显著影响了公司的现金股利政策。随着高管权力的增大,公司现金股利的分配倾向和力度越来越低。进一步的研究发现,高管权力影响了现金股利的边际价值。Cash Dividend Policy is always a hot issue for academic researchers,but most of them analyze the motivations of cash dividends from the view point of agency theory and few researchers emphasize the managerial power,which is the approach to realize the motivations of cash dividends. Based on the fact of the low cash dividends in China＇s capital market,this paper analyzes the relationship between managerial power and cash dividend policy,and its value effect. It reveals that managerial power has a great effect on the cash dividend policy. With the increase of the managerial power,the inclination and level of cash dividends gets much weaker,the marginal value of cash dividends gets lower.

关 键 词：高管权力 现金股利政策 价值效应 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F275