基于同事压力与群体规范的团队合作  

Team Cooperation based on Peer Pressure and Group Norms

作　　者：魏光兴[1] 张舒[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学经济与管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2017年第2期311-318,共8页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102165);重庆市科学技术项目(KJ110408)

摘　　要：通过引入传统自利偏好假设忽略的公平偏好和群体规范,用行为博弈论方法在一个统一框架下,研究了同事压力形成机制、群体规范约束机制以及两者对团队合作的激励作用,并对团队精神培养进行了行为博弈分析。研究结果表明:公平偏好会自发地形成内部同事压力;公平偏好下,即使付出成本也会惩罚搭便车者,从而同事惩罚通过公平偏好会形成外部同事压力;较强的内部同事压力和外部同事压力在合作预期较高的群体规范中都能够唯一实施团队合作;而当公平偏好太弱、实施同事惩罚的成本太高或群体规范的合作预期太低时,搭便车行为将成为主导。这为现实中团队合作和搭便车行为都广泛存在的实证和实验发现提供了理论解释,也为团队精神培养和团队合作激励机制设计提供了决策参考。To resolve the contradiction between theoretical research and empirical study on team incentive, by incorporating the fairness preference and group norms, which both are ignored by the traditional function of social norms and how they facilitate team cooperation, and pr foundation for promoting teamwork in an unified approach of behavioral game ovide the economic theory analysis. We find that both the internal peer pressures, stemming from fairness preference, and the external peer pressures, resulting from peer sanctions, even with costs through fairness preference, can implement team cooperation uniquely if only quite a number of agents is expected to collaborate initiatively by the relevant social norms; when the fairness preference is too weak, the cost of peer sanctions is too high or the collaborative expectation is too low, the free-riding behaviors dominate. This provide an explanation to the coexistence of corporation and free-riding behavior in reality, which is found and confirmed by empirical and experimental studies, and also provide the reference for decision making in cultivating team spirit and designing incentive mechanism for team production.

关 键 词：公平偏好 同事压力 群体规范 团队合作 行为博弈论 

分 类 号：F406[经济管理—产业经济]