股票指数期权激励的定价分析  

Pricing Analysis of the Indexed Stock Option Incentives

作　　者：王长领[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《决策借鉴》2002年第2期25-27,共3页

摘　　要：我国企业现行股票期权激励方案的本质是一种期股激励 ,使激励效果弱化。此外 ,考核业绩不尽合理 ,无法排除经理人无法控制的系统性不确定因素的影响。因此 ,给出一个基于相对业绩评价的、改进的指数期权定价模型 ,既可以排除经营者无法控制的外界因素的干扰 ,还可以通过惩罚函数来防止经营者操纵模型中的一些参数。The present stock option incentive plans of domestic companies are future stock incentives in essence, which weaken the incentive effect. Furthermore, the criteria of performance evaluation are unreasonable because the impact of systemic uncertainty factors, which is beyond the control of executives, couldn't be filtered out. In this thesis, an improved indexed model is given that is based on relative performance pay. This model cannot only filter out common risks beyond the executive's control, but also prevent the executives' conduct of manipulating specified parameters by an optional penalty function.

关 键 词：长期激励机制 股票指数期权 定价模型 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]