企业社会责任、盈余公告择机与信息效率  

Corporate Social Responsibility,Timing of Earnings Announcements and Informational Efficiency

作　　者：王磊[1] 季思颖 黎文靖[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620 [2]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2017年第4期99-111,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71203139);国家自然科学基金项目(71272214)

摘　　要：基于投资者有限关注理论,考察了企业社会责任对年报披露时机的影响及产生的经济后果,发现当公司披露的年报是坏消息时,社会责任评级较好的企业选择在投资者关注不足时进行信息披露的概率较高,导致私人信息无法通过其交易行为融入资产定价过程中,股价波动呈现出较强的同步性。这一结果表明,社会责任评级较好的企业会根据投资者的关注状态差异择机进行盈余公告,以转移投资者对坏消息的注意力,从而降低股价的信息效率。From the perspective of limited investor attention,this paper investigates the effect of CSR on the timing of earnings announcements and the information efficiency of stock price. We find that if the stocks experience the most negative SUE,socially responsible firms prefer disclosing financial reports when investors＇ attention is distracted. For stocks with little investors＇ attention,private information cannot be incorporated into asset price,which aggravates stock price synchronicity and reduces the information efficiency. These results indicate that the management of socially responsible firms will choose the timing of earnings announcement based on the state of investor attention.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 盈余公告择机行为 信息效率 投资者有限关注 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]