超募资金与高管薪酬契约  

IPO Overfunding and CEOs' Compensation Contract

作　　者：张路[1] 张瀚文[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院/国有资产管理协同创新中心,100048 [2]财政部会计资格评价中心,100045

出　　处：《会计研究》2017年第4期38-44,共7页Accounting Research

基　　金：北京工商大学国有资产管理协同创新中心项目(GZ20131002);北京工商大学青年教师科研启动基金(QNJJ2015-07)的资助;国家自然科学基金项目(71502007和71672003);北京市社会科学基金重点课题(14JGA011)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：文章探讨首次公开发行超募资金对上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。研究发现,总体而言,当超募资金用于补充流动资金的程度增加时,上市公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性显著降低,薪酬粘性显著提高。表明超募资金补充公司流动性的行为增加了公司代理成本,降低了高管薪酬契约有效性,弱化了高管激励。进一步研究显示,超募资金补充流动性对薪酬契约的不利影响在低竞争行业的公司中表现的更为显著;大股东两权分离会加剧超募资金补充流动性对高管薪酬契约的负面影响。募集资金的有效使用依赖于相关治理机制的建设。文章的结论丰富了IPO募集资金使用效率方面的文献,对于政策制定者具有重要的参考价值。This paper analyzes the influence of IPO overfunding on CEOs'compensation contract effectiveness.We find that the pay-performance sensitivity is significantly lower and compensation stickiness is considerably greater if firms direct more excess funds to supplement liquidity.These results support that excess funds providing liquidity provide much chance of rent-seeking and then exacerbate agency problem.Further studies investigate that above conclusions are more significant for firms in lowly competitive industries and those under big shareholder's two-right-separating condition,relative to firms in highly competitive industries and without separating of two rights respectively.These results deepen our understanding of efficiency of IPO overfunding and then have an enlightening role on firms and policy makers.

关 键 词：超募资金 高管薪酬 产品市场竞争 大股东两权分离 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]