产权性质、薪酬结构和公司价值  

Ownership Types,CEO Compensation Structure and Firm Value

作　　者：蒋涛[1] 徐悦[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学会计学院,重庆400054 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《预测》2017年第3期28-35,共8页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372150)

摘　　要：基于上市公司《高级管理人员薪酬管理办法》提供的经理人基本薪酬与绩效薪酬数据,本文研究不同产权性质企业高管薪酬结构的差异,以及这种差异对公司价值的影响。研究发现,与国有上市公司相比,民营上市公司高管的基本薪酬更高、绩效薪酬比重更低;民营上市公司提供更高和更加安全的薪酬会导致其公司价值的下降。研究说明国企经理人薪酬制度安排会影响民营企业薪酬设计。本文研究结果也突显基本薪酬的功能,高风险承受的经理人通过高额无风险的基本薪酬来弥补其多余的风险承受。Based on the manually collected executive compensation structure data from the disclosed Senior Managers＇ Compensation Management Principles, this paper studies the executive compensation structure dispersion between differ- ent ownership types and their impacts on firm＇ s value. The results show that compared to the managers in the state- owned listed firms, the managers in the private-owned listed firms hold higher proportion on base salary and lower proportion on bonus. However, higher and safer compensation in the private-owned listed firms would damage the firm＇ s value. The executive compensation structure in the private-owned listed firms would be affected by the institutional compensation arrangement in the state-owned firms. Moreover, this paper emphasizes the base salary＇ s function, that the high risk-taking manager would prefer more base salary to offset his excessive risk.

关 键 词：产权性质 基本薪酬 绩效薪酬 公司价值 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]