团队默会知识共享行为的演化博弈模型及仿真分析  

Evolutionary Game Model of Tacit Knowledge Sharing within a Team including Simulation Analysis

作　　者：梁启华[1] 张春阳[1] 朱美娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院,山东烟台264005

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2017年第10期154-159,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于本体论的企业默会知识转化与共享研究及应用"(70971077);国家自然科学基金项目"协同创新团队隐性知识共享有效性的随机动态博弈分析"(71501113)

摘　　要：借助演化博弈理论,引入奖罚与监督机制,构建团队默会知识共享行为的演化博弈模型,分析系统演化路径、演化稳定策略及其影响因素的作用机理,并给出模拟仿真。博弈支付矩阵及其相关参数将深刻影响到团队默会知识共享行为的演化路径。奖罚机制与监督机制的有效结合,将会大大促使团队默会知识共享行为的演化路径最终收敛于选择(共享,共享)的演化稳定策略。By using evolutionary game theory and introducing award mechanism and oversight mechanism, this article conducts an evolutionary game model of tacit knowledge sharing within a team, and analyzes system evolution path, the evolutionary stable strategy and its influencing factors of the mechanism. Meanwhile simulation analysis is given. Game payoff matrix and its related parameters will profoundly affect the evolution path of team tacit knowledge sharing behavior.The effective combination of rewards and punishment mechanism and supervision mechanism will greatly promote the evolution path of tacit knowledge sharing behavior which eventually converges to choose （ sharing, sharing ） evolutionary stable strategy.

关 键 词：团队 默会知识共享 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]