食品安全社会共治的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of Evolutionary Game of Social Co-governance of Food Safety

作　　者：赵大伟[1] 成冬梅[1] 陈建梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学管理学院,哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《中国调味品》2017年第6期175-180,共6页China Condiment

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(16YJA790067);黑龙江省经济社会发展重点研究课题(JD2015014)

摘　　要：食品安全事件舆论燃点低,影响社会和谐发展。针对我国食品安全监管状况,运用博弈论的方法对食品生产者和销售企业进行博弈分析,发现双方的策略选择主要依据政府监管的策略选择。因此,进一步对食品供给者与政府进行博弈分析。研究表明:现行的食品安全监管体制,监管成本高而效果不佳,通过食品安全社会共治可以有效解决:加大政府激励力度,提高食品行业集体声誉;在政府主导下,引导各方主体共同参与食品安全治理,既可以降低地方政府监管成本,又能提高食品安全治理效率和效果。Food safety is a sensitive topic, which affects the harmonious development of society. Based on the situation of food safety supervision in China, analyze the game between food producers and sale enterprises by using game theory. The strategy selection of both sides is mainly based on the strategy choices of government regulation. Therefore, further analysis on the game between food suppliers and the government is studied. The research shows that under the current food safety supervision system, the cost of supervision is high, but the effect is poor. Through social co-governance of food safety,the problems can be effectively solved by increasing the power of government incentive, improving the collective reputation of food industry~ under the leading of the government, guide the main parties to participate in food safety management, which can reduce the cost of local government supervision, and also can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of food safety management.

关 键 词：食品安全 社会共治 演化博弈 

分 类 号：TS201.1[轻工技术与工程—食品科学]