资源、权力、制度盲点与国有企业高管财务腐败治理  

Resources,Power and the Blind Spot of Institution with Financial Corruption of the State-owned Enterprise Executives

作　　者：范合君[1] 吕雨露 FAN Hejun LU Yulu(Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2016年第12期29-36,共8页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"国有企业高管腐败行为治理研究"(14BGL056)

摘　　要：目前,国内对于国有企业高管的财务腐败行为较少进行详细研究。本文利用2011—2015年《法人》杂志的企业犯罪案例追踪统计213个案例数据,进行描述性统计分析,发现地域、职位、财务腐败的方式对国企高管财务腐败具有重要影响,同时针对得出的重要影响因素本文提出了国企高管进行财务腐败的机制,得出资源、权力、制度盲点与国企高管财务腐败的系统论。At present,there is little research on the financial corruption behavior of the state-owned enterprise executives in China.By using the Magazine of 213 corporate crime cases from 2011 to 2015,this paper makes a description of statistical analysis.The results show that;geographical location,position and the way of financial corruption have significant effect on the executives of financial corruption.At the same time,according to the important characteristics of the state-owned enterprise executives,this paper puts forward the mechanism of financial corruption;resources,power,the blind spot of institution and the financial corruption of state-owned enterprises are formed to be a circulatory system.

关 键 词：国企高管 财务腐败 机制研究 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]