相对业绩比较和多代理人激励研究  

Relative Performance Comparison and Multi-agent Research

作　　者：刘鸿雁[1] 李潇[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学(保定)经济管理系,河北保定071000

出　　处：《科技和产业》2017年第6期91-95,共5页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJA630053)

摘　　要：为了研究如何激励供煤商提供更符合发电商需要的煤炭,建立了多代理人、多任务的委托代理模型。假设供煤商为代理人,发电商为委托人,研究了根据煤炭的质量、交货和价格不同,发电商给供煤商的激励价格的制定问题。分析了两个代理人在竞争和独立关系下,激励合同的制定。研究发现,在多个代理人有竞争关系时,引入相对业绩比较,即将代理人工资同其业绩相对另一代理人绩效的高出部分挂钩,并不总是帕累托改进。而且,在相对业绩比较方面,不同维度的工作能起到和相同维度的工作相同的业绩比较作用。In. order to study how to motivate the coal supplier to provide coal which more suitable for electricity generation., established multi-a-gent, multi-task principal-agent model. Assuming that coal supplier as the agent, electricity generators as the consigner, studied according to the different coal quality, delivery and price, electricity generators how to formulate the incentive price for coal supplier. Respectively analyzes how to establish incentive contract when, two agents are compete and independent. This paper found that more than, one agent are in. competitive relations, the introduction, of relative performance comparison., that agent salary is relative to the other higher part of agent performance is not always the pa-reto improvement. Moreover, in. relative performance comparison, aspect, the work of different dimensions can. have the same performance compari-son. with the same dimensions of work.

关 键 词：相对业绩比较 代理人 委托人 激励机制 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]