金字塔控制、高管政治晋升与地方国企避税行为  

Pyramidal Control,Political Promotion Incentives and Local SOEs' Tax Avoidance Behavior

作　　者：代彬[1] 彭程[1] 刘星[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川外国语大学国际商学院/国别经济与国际商务研究中心,重庆400031 [2]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2017年第4期105-116,共12页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"控制权配置;审计监督与国企高管自利行为"(编号:71402109;主持人:代彬);国家自然科学基金重点项目"制度环境;公司财务政策选择和动态演化研究"(编号:71232004;主持人:刘星);重庆市教委人文社科研究重点项目"我国创业板上市公司控制权配置;管理层防御与企业成长性研究"(编号:16SKGH102;主持人:代彬)

摘　　要：国有企业的税收负担问题近年来受到了理论界和实务界的普遍关注。以2008—2015年的地方国有上市公司为研究样本,本文考察了金字塔控制模式和高管政治晋升激励对企业避税决策的影响机制。研究发现:金字塔层级的增加会提高地方国企的税收激进水平,揭示金字塔结构蕴含了阻隔政府干预的治理功效;高管的政治晋升激励不但抑制了企业的激进避税行为,还会弱化金字塔层级对激进避税的正向影响,表明政治晋升锦标赛对企业经营效率发挥了潜在的负效应。进一步研究发现,金字塔层级与税收激进性的关系在市场竞争环境下更为显著,而当地财政压力的增加不但会遏制金字塔结构对避税行为的促进作用,还会使具有较强政治晋升预期的高管在避税决策上更趋保守。本文的研究结论为当前正在推进的深化地方国企改革等政策实践提供了经验启示。Based on the sample of local state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2015,this paper examines the impact mechanism of pyramidal structure and executives' political promotion incentive on corporate tax avoidance behavior.We find that the extension of the pyramidal layers will improve the local SOEs' tax aggressiveness,indicating that the pyramidal structure contains the governance effect of reducing the government intervention;The political promotion incentives of executives can not only inhibit the firm's aggressive tax avoidance,but also weaken the positive impact of pyramidal layers on tax aggressiveness,which reveals that the'political promotion tournament'mechanism plays a potential negative role on business efficiency.Further research shows that the relationship between pyramidal layers and tax aggressiveness is more significant in the environment of strong market competition,and the increase of local government's financial pressure would probably both limit the pyramidal structure's positive role on tax avoidance and make more conservative the executives with strong political promotion expectation in terms of tax avoidance decision-making.

关 键 词：金字塔层级 政治晋升 税收规避 地方国企 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F276.1