家族企业非控股股东性质与股权制衡有效性——基于家族控制权视角的分析  

The Relationship between the Nature of Non-Controlling Shareholders in Family Business and the Effectiveness of Power Balance——A Study from the Perspective of Family Control

作　　者：冯宝军[1] 解明明[1] 孙秀峰[1] FENG Baojun XlE Mingming SUN Xiufeng(Faculty of Management and Economics, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China)

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理与经济学部,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第3期1-10,共10页Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社科基金资助项目:"基于有效性视角的中国高等院校财务资源配置研究"(16BGL060);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资助项目:"社会资本对中国家族企业融资约束影响机理研究"(DUT16RW206)

摘　　要：文章以2010~2014年中国主板上市家族企业为样本,首次从家族控制权这一视角考察了外部股东性质对股权制衡治理作用的影响。研究发现:(1)随着家族控制权的增加,家族控股股东的"掏空"程度会显著降低,显示其强烈的"企业主"意识,此时非控股股东在家族控制权处于[10%,30%)时制衡效果最好;(2)随着家族控制权的变化,不同性质的外部股东在抑制家族控股股东"掏空"行为的有效性方面存在显著差异:在[10%,30%)控制权内,民营企业的制衡效果最好;在[30%,50%)控制权内,国家股东与机构投资者的制衡效果最强;在[50%,100%)控制权内,民营企业可以借助外部治理环境有效抑制家族股东的"掏空"行为。Taking with China＇s A-share listed family companies between 2010-2014as samples,this paper researches on how the nature of non-controlling shareholders affects the power balance from the perspective of family control.Two results are shown by the research.First,with the increase of the family control,the degree of the ‘tunneling＇of the family controlling shareholders will significantly decrease,which implies the strong enterprise owner consciousness of the family controlling shareholders.When the control of the family shareholders is at[10%,30%）,the power balance reaches optimum state.Second,with the change of the control of family shareholders,the effects of different types of non-controlling shareholders have on restraining family controlling shareholders＇ tunneling behaviors are significantly different.When the control of family controlling shareholders is at[10%,30%）,the effect of the power balance by the non-controlling private enterprises is at the best.When the control of family controlling shareholders＇ is up to[30%,50%）,the effect of the power balance of the non-controlling state-owned shareholders and institutional investors is at the optimum.When the control of family controlling shareholders hits[30%,50%）,the private enterprise can effectively restrain the tunneling behaviors of family controlling shareholders by means of external governance environment.

关 键 词：家族企业 控制权 掏空 外部股东性质 股权制衡 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理]