政府绩效考核导向下国有企业高管薪酬激励及财务监督效应研究  

Stimulating Executive Compensation and Financial Supervision under the Institution of SASAC Performance Oriented Appraisal

作　　者：周正[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨商业大学学术理论研究部,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《求是学刊》2017年第4期47-54,共8页Seeking Truth

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"上市公司CFO财务操纵行为与绩效影响的作用机制及制度优化研究";项目编号:15BGL063;黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目"黑龙江省国有企业体制性产能过剩形成机理及化解路径研究";项目编号:16JYB10

摘　　要：在国资委委派CFO或CEO制度的背景下,国有企业薪酬激励是否实现国资委对国有企业高管和企业的考核目标一直是理论研究关注的重点。由于国资委对下属企业负责人主要采取业绩目标考核标准,因此CEO和CFO薪酬都与财务绩效显著正相关;进一步研究发现,正是由于对企业负责人整体的财务绩效考核导向,使得国资委控股上市公司高管难以明确个体责任目标,国资委委派的CFO对于企业超额销售管理费用没有明显的监督和抑制作用,即使CFO成为董事会成员也没能增强其财务监督效应。总体上,目前国资委控股公司高管薪酬激励作用主要体现在绩效目标的实现方面,而出于财务监督目标的国资委财务总监委派则没有发挥明显的作用,因此,对于不同职位高管,集体考核业绩的导向有必要进行分类调整。In the context of the CFO or CEO general appointing system put by SASAC, whether SASAC can make regular inspections of senior managers and performance of state-owned enterprises through salary incen- tive or not has become the focus of theoretical research. People responsible for SASAC subordinate enterprises are mainly assessed with a standard of performance objectives, so CEOs and CFOs salary levels have a signifi- cant positive correlation with financial performance and economic value added. Further studies show that as persons in charge of the enterprise are examined by overall financial performance, CFOs appointed by SASAC have no significant supervision and inhibition effect on excess sales and administrative expenses and even CFOs chosen to be members of the board don＇ t enhance its supervision effect on the expenditure of excess sales and administrative expenses. Meanwhile, the study also shows that the increase of CEOs or CFOs salary levels helps to improve the financial performance in SASAC-controlled enterprises. However, perrsons in charge of the enterprise are checked on overall performance appraisal which can make CEOs, especially CEOs responsible for financial operations ignore the supervision of excess sales and administrative expenses, so it＇ s necessary for executives in different positions to make classification adjustment on the guide.

关 键 词：国资委绩效考核 高管薪酬 监督效应 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F276.1