非执行董事影响高管薪酬激励契约的选择吗？--来自国有上市公司的经验证据  

Do Non-executive Directors Affect the Choice of Executive Compensation Contract?——Evidence from China's State-Owned Listed Companies

作　　者：王敏[1] 黄新莹 黄超[3] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014 [2]菏泽职业学院经济管理系,山东菏泽274031 [3]上海财经大学会计学院.上海200433

出　　处：《经济与管理评论》2017年第4期38-47,共10页Review of Economy and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司IPO发审监管效率的研究:基于‘关系’与‘舆情’视角的分析”(项目编号:71372038)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：考察了国有上市公司的非执行董事是否会影响公司高管薪酬激励契约的选择。研究发现,非执行董事能够显著提高国有公司高管薪酬激励契约的有效性,抑制公司高管对于在职消费隐形激励契约的选择。进一步的分析显示,对于市场化水平较高地区的国有公司,由于货币薪酬契约的成本更小,且对于公司业绩的提升作用更大,因此非执行董事对高管在职消费激励契约选择的抑制作用更明显。在机构投资者持股比例较低的国有公司,机构投资者发挥外部监督和治理的作用较弱,非执行董事抑制公司高管进行在职消费激励的作用更明显。This paper examines whether the non-executive directors of the state-owned listing corporations influence the choice of the executive compensation incentive contracts. We find that the non-executive directors can significantly improve the effectiveness of the state-owned companies＂ executive compensation incentive contract, and restrain the choice of the company executives for the perks of invisible incentive contract. Further analysis shows that for the state-owned companies located in higher level market environment, due to lower cost and better promotion incentive of monetary compensation contract, the inhibition of non-executive directors on choice of perks＂ compensation incentive contract is more obvious. In the state-owned companies with a lower proportion of the institutional investors, institutional investors play a weak role in the external supervision and governance, so the effect of the non-executive director inhibiting managers＂ consuming perks is more obvious.

关 键 词：非执行董事 高管薪酬 市场化水平 机构投资者 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]