论笛卡尔的质料错误观念  

On Descartes's Materially False Ideas

作　　者：叶斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]德国弗赖堡大学哲学系

出　　处：《世界哲学》2017年第5期77-83,共7页World Philosophy

摘　　要：笛卡尔的观念论是其哲学创新的一个重要议题,而他对感性观念的态度,即将感性观念理解为一种质料错误观念则引起了巨大的争议。本文旨在提供一种新的方式以理解笛卡尔的质料错误观念。通过具体的文本分析,本文试图说明,在笛卡尔讨论质料错误观念的相关段落中存在一种辩证的方法,而通过这种方法我们可以确定何为质料错误观念。首先,本文将解释何为表象非物为物;其次,本文将尝试通过此种辩证方法来解决质料错误观念的问题。Descartes's theory of ideas is an important issue in his philosophical innovations;and his attitude towards sensory ideas,which he considers as materially false,invokes a great number of disputations.This paper aims at providing a new way of understanding Descartes's materially false ideas.The core work is to demonstrate that among Descartes's statements,there is a dialectical method which works in handling the problem of materially false ideas.Firstly,this paper will argue what a non-thing as a thing to represent means.Secondly,it attempts to illustrate how man can achieve a better understanding of that problem by employing this dialectical method.

关 键 词：质料错误的观念 非物 客观实在性 匮乏 

分 类 号：B565.21[哲学宗教—外国哲学]