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机构地区:[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110167 [2]沈阳师范大学软件学院,辽宁沈阳110034
出 处:《工业工程与管理》2017年第4期91-99,114,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572031);辽宁省哲学社会科学规划基金资助项目(L16AZY032)
摘 要:探讨了双寡头制造商和一个零售商构成的二阶绿色供应链的竞合关系和研发模式选择问题。基于两制造商间的横向竞合关系及是否共同研发,构建了四种博弈模型,给出了各种情景下的均衡绿色度和均衡价格,分析了竞合关系和研发模式对供应链成员绩效和策略选择的影响。数值算例分析表明:合作与共同研发策略可使制造商获得最大收益,却不会使零售商获益最大;共同研发加剧的竞争会使制造商受损,但零售商却可从中受益;竞争程度和绿色度敏感系数会影响制造商和零售商的策略选择。The selection of competition-cooperation and R&D models in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of two oligopoly manufacturers and one retailer was discussed. Four game models based on two manufacturers' horizontal competition-cooperation and cooperative R&D were provided to obtain equilibrium green degree and equilibrium price. The impact of competition- cooperation and R&D model on the players' optimal strategies was analyzed. Numerical results reveal that the strategy of cooperation and cooperative R&D allows two oligopoly manufacturers to maximize their profits,but does not benefit the retailer. The retailers may increase their profit but two manufacturers' profits are to decline because of the intensified competition in cooperative R&D model. The degree of competition and the sensitivity coefficient of green degree affect the strategy selection of manufacturers and the retailer.
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