基于REVA的商业银行薪酬激励有效性研究  

Effectiveness of Commercial Bank Salary Incentive Based on REVA

作　　者：谭德俊[1] 姚飞羽 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《西安财经学院学报》2017年第5期5-12,共8页Journal of Xi’an University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：湖南省博士后科研资助专项计划(2014RS4015)

摘　　要：文章在引入综合绩效评价指标REVA(经济增加值回报率)的基础上,建立基于面板数据的SUR模型进行横向分析并建立带有虚拟变量的混合效应模型做纵向分析,研究了商业银行REVA和员工薪酬激励的关系,检验薪酬激励机制的有效性。研究表明:国有控股商业银行的员工薪酬对REVA作用不显著;而中小股份制商业银行、城市商业银行的员工薪酬和REVA是显著正相关的,薪酬激励作用是有效的,且巴塞尔协议Ⅲ实施后,样本银行的员工薪酬激励作用明显加强。Introduced comprehensive performance evaluation index, based on 13 listed commercial banks as sample,it can be divided into three categories, through the establishment of the SUR model based on panel data for horizontal analysis, selecting representative commercial banks establishing mixed effects model with a virtual variable for longitudinal analysis,to study the relationship between bank risk-adjusted per- formance indicators of REVA and salary incentive for employees and to test the effectiveness of the salary incentive mechanism. The results show that salary incentive effect of the state-owned commercial banks is not significant, and there is significant positive correlation in the small and medium-sized joint-stock, city commercial bank, salary incentive system is effective;after the introduction of Basel III, the sample banks＇ salary incentive effect improved remarkably.

关 键 词：商业银行 SUR模型 经济增加值回报率(REVA) 薪酬激励机制 

分 类 号：F832.33[经济管理—金融学]