国企高管政治晋升、研发投资与企业绩效  

Political Promotion of State-owned Enterprises' Executives,R&D and Performance

作　　者：罗富碧[1] 刘露[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学经济与管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2017年第16期91-97,共7页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(15BGL053);国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CJY054)

摘　　要：近年来,国企高管政治晋升激励效果逐渐受到学者们关注。为此,基于2009-2014年国有上市公司752个样本值,从研发投资视角考察高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系。研究结果表明:国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效显著正相关,说明与政治晋升机会较小的国企高管相比,政治晋升机会较大的国企高管更注重企业绩效;国企高管政治晋升与研发投资显著负相关,在晋升当年,高管出于自身利益考虑会减少研发投资;研发投资对企业绩效存在显著促进作用,并对国企高管政治晋升与企业绩效关系起调节作用。In recent years,more and more scholars focus on the effects of executives' political promotion in China.In this paper,we test the relationship between political promotion and enterprise performance from the perspective of R&D by using 752 sample of state-owned listed companies during 2009-2014 in China.The results show that a significant positive correlation is observed between political promotion and performance,indicating executives who have higher political promotion opportunities pay more attention to corporate performance compared with those who have lower political promotion opportunities;political promotion has significant negative correlation with R&D,in the promotion year,executives,proceeding from their own interests,will reduce R&D spending;R&D expenditures stimulate performance significantly;R&D investment play a regulatory role in the relationship between executive political promotion and performance.

关 键 词：国有企业 政治晋升 研发投资 企业绩效 调节效应 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]