政治联系、隐性激励与企业价值——以民营企业在职消费为例  

Political Connections,Implicit Incentives,and Firm Value:Evidence from Perks in Private Listed Firms

作　　者：张奇峰 戴佳君 樊飞[3] Qifeng Zhang Jiajun Dai and Fei Fart(School of Accounting, Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting and Economics, Shanghai 201620, China School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Institute of Technology, Shanghai 201418, China School of Accountancy, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200233, China)

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计金融学院会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海应用技术大学经济与管理学院,上海201418 [3]上海财经大学会计学院,上海200233

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2017年第3期56-71,共16页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(12YJA790197);国家自然科学基金项目(71372070)

摘　　要：以民营企业在职消费为例,考察政治关联如何影响隐性激励及企业价值。研究发现,相对于无政治联系的民营企业,有政治联系的民营企业在职消费更低;民营企业的在职消费对企业价值具有负面影响,而政治联系削弱了在职消费对民营企业价值的负面影响。总体来看,民营企业的政治联系有助于节约企业的交易成本与减少政府的利益侵占,从而提升了企业价值。This paper takes the perks of private firms as the sample, and examines the effect of political connections on implicit incentives and the firm value. The results find that the perks of private firms with political connections are lower compared to those without political connections, that the perks are negatively related to the firm value of private firms, and that political connections alleviate the negative relationship between them. In general, political connections benefit improving the firm value of private firms through saving transaction cost and decreasing benefit expropriation from the government.

关 键 词：政治联系 隐性激励 在职消费 企业价值 民营企业 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]