上市公司负债融资的相机治理作用研究——基于高管薪酬——业绩敏感性视角  

A Study on the Contingent Governance Function of Listed Companies' Debt Financing——From the Perspective of Executive Compensation-Performance Sensitivity

作　　者：陈晓珊 Chen Xiao-shan(Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China)

机构地区：[1]暨南大学产业经济研究院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《税务与经济》2017年第6期25-32,共8页Taxation and Economy

摘　　要：公司负债融资是否是一种有效的公司治理机制?利用我国上市公司微观数据并基于高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的视角实证检验公司负债融资的相机治理作用,结果发现:公司负债融资与高管薪酬之间呈现显著的U型关系;公司负债融资会显著提高高管的薪酬—业绩敏感性;对于外部竞争程度较低和内部高管薪酬水平较低的公司,公司负债融资与高管薪酬之间的U型关系并不明显,两者间仅存在显著的抑制作用;公司负债融资对高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的正向促进作用不受产品市场竞争和高管薪酬激励水平高低的影响。上述研究结论充分肯定了负债融资对于降低代理成本的作用。研究成果不仅丰富了相关经验研究,而且也有助于厘清我国上市公司负债融资的治理作用。Is corporate debt financing an effective corporate governance mechanism？ Based on the micro-data of listed companies in China, an empirical study is conducted in this paper to examine the contingent governance function of companies＇ debt financing from the perspective of executive compensation-performance sensitivity. The result shows that： there is a significant U-shaped relationship between corporate debt financing and executive compensation; corporate debt financing strikingly increases executive compensation-performance sensitivity. For the companies with low external competition and low internal salary, the U-shaped relationship between corporate debt financing and executive compensation is not obvious, and there is only a markedly inhibition between then,. The positive effect of corporate debt financing on executive compensation-performance sensitivity is not influenced by the product market competition or the motivating level of executive compensation. The above conclusion full confirms that debt financing could reduce agency costs. This research result not only enriches the relevant empiri- cal research, but also helps to clarify the governance function of debt financing of listed companies in China.

关 键 词：负债融资 相机治理作用 高管薪酬 薪酬—业绩敏感性 产品市场竞争 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]