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机构地区:[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆400030 [3]重庆大学数学与统计学院,重庆401331
出 处:《系统管理学报》2017年第6期1168-1175,共8页Journal of Systems & Management
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172084);国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2012BAF12B09)
摘 要:针对制造商开辟的电子直销渠道与传统零售渠道存在渠道冲突情景下的双渠道供应链合作广告问题,建立了一个随机微分对策模型进行研究,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求得集中决策和Stackelberg主从博弈下均衡的广告投入量和广告成本分担比例。研究结果表明:供应链成员的合作广告决策除了与渠道边际利润相关,同时还取决于零售商广告对电子直销渠道产生的广告影响效应;进一步,通过对比集中决策和Stackelberg主从博弈下均衡的系统利润水平,给出了一个双向参与合作广告协调策略实现了双渠道供应链协调,并用数值算例验证了本文的相关结论。We build a stochastic differential game model to handle the cooperative advertising problem in a dual-channel supply chain where the channel conflicts between manufacturer's electronic direct channel and retailer's traditional channel. By applying Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, the equilibrium advertising investment quantity and advertising cost sharing proportion have been solved under centralized and decentralized decision settings, respectively. The results show that, the cooperative advertising decisions of supply chain members are not only related to the margin profits of channels, but also dependent on the impact of retailer's local advertising effort on electronic direct channel simultaneously. Through comparing the profits of supply chain system under centralized setting with those under decentralized setting, a Bilateral-advertising-cost-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain in which both the manufacturer and the retailer share each other's advertising costs. Numerical experiments have been conducted to verify the aforementioned conclusions in the paper.
关 键 词:双渠道供应链 合作广告 微分对策 STACKELBERG博弈
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