怀疑 纠结 批驳——戴震孟学四书人性观之嬗变  

Suspicion Tanglement Refutation——The Evolution of Human Nature View in Dai Zhen's Four Mencius Ideology Books

作　　者：刘瑾辉[1] 陈子暄 

机构地区：[1]扬州大学文学院

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2017年第6期168-177,共10页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目"清代孟学史"(12BZX041);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"中国人性论通史"子项目"清代人性论史"(15&ZDB004);国家社会科学基金重大招标项目"中国孟学史"子项目"清代孟学史"(11&ZD2083);教育部人文社会科学基金项目"清代<孟子>学史"(12YJA720017)

摘　　要：戴震坚持性一元论,认为"性以类别""性不同呈乎才",强调"知即善",竭力批驳宋儒"天理之性善,气质之性恶"的性二元论。戴震孟学四书之人性观,前后既有继承,又有明显发展,经历了一个否定之否定、不断深化和完善的过程,凸显出戴震对程朱理学由怀疑、纠结、远离到全力批驳的心路发展历程。Dai Zhen insists on the monism of human nature,thinks that"nature is differentiated by categories"and"the difference in nature reflects quality",emphasizes that"mind knowledge is good",and strongly disproves the Confucian dualism of human nature of Song Dynasty that"heavenly principles are good nature and temperament is wicked nature". The human nature view of Dai Zhen's four Mencius ideology books inherits the past ideas on the one hand and develops obviously on the other hand,which experiences a process of negation of negation,constant deepening and improvement. It highlights Dai Zhen's mental path from suspicion,tanglement and alienation to the full refutation on Neo-Confucianism of Cheng-Zhu.

关 键 词：清代学术 孟子 戴震孟学四书 人性论 

分 类 号：B222.6[哲学宗教—中国哲学]