政府补助会助长高管在职消费吗?  

Will Government Subsidies Encourage Executives on Perquisite Consumption?

作　　者：李映照[1] 翟永芳 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2017年第12期104-109,共6页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文运用2008—2014年获得政府补助的A股民营上市公司数据,通过在职消费估计模型,研究政府补助对高管在职消费的影响。研究发现,民营企业获得的政府补助越多,高管在职消费越严重;而外部审计能对高管在职消费起到显著的抑制作用。这表明政府补助成为高管在职消费的一个隐蔽的渠道来源,为研究高管寻租行为提供了新的经验证据。Based on the data of 2008-2014 from the A-Share private listed companies that obtained government subsidies,this paper studies the impact of government subsidies on executives' perquisite consumption,and explores whether external audit really plays a supervisory role in this process.The empirical result shows that the more subsidies the private listed companies have obtained in the current or previous period,the more perquisite consumption there is in the current period.That is to say,there exists senior executives using government subsidies to carry on perquisite consumption.At the same time,with the improvement of audit quality,this behavior can be significantly suppressed.In summary,what this paper indicates is government subsidies have become a hidden source of executives' perquisite consumption,which provides new empirical evidence for studying rent-seeking behavior of executives.Besides,it has been proved that external audit could suppress perquisite consumption significantly.This shows that private enterprises should pay more attention to the role of external audit.

关 键 词：政府补助 在职消费 审计质量 民营企业 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F812.45[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51