高管的风险态度与股权激励方式选择  

THE EXECUTIVES RISK ATTITUDE AND THE EQUITY INCENTIVE METHOD

作　　者：徐经长[1] 张璋[1] 张东旭 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,邮政编码100872 [2]安徽大学商学院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2017年第12期73-87,共15页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(15CGL017);安徽省自然科学基金项目(1308085MG113)的资助

摘　　要：公司如何选择有效的股权激励方式一直是理论研究的重要话题。本文以2006—2016年中国A股实行股权激励的上市公司为研究对象,探究高管的风险态度差异对上市公司股权激励方式选择的影响。研究结果显示,高管的风险回避倾向越强,公司越倾向于授予风险较大的股票期权方式激励高管,以激发高管的风险承担意愿;高管的风险承担水平越高,公司则越倾向于采用风险较小的限制性股票期权方式进行激励,以削弱高管的过度风险追求倾向。进一步研究表明,当股权激励方式基于风险承担与高管的风险态度相匹配时,公司会有更好的业绩表现。本文的研究结论为激励契约设计提供了重要启示。How to select effective equity incentive method has always been an important topic in theo- retical research. This paper analyzes the impact of executives risk attitude on the company equity incentive method, using A-share listed companies as research sample which announced implementation of equity in- centive during 2006--2016. The results indicate that if the risk aversion tendency of executive is stronger, the company is more inclined to grant riskier stock options to motivate executives to be more risk-taking. If the senior executives are more strongly tend to take risk, the shareholders prefer to take restricted stock with lower risk to undermine executives＇ excessive risk pursuit. The further study shows that if incentive method meets with the executives risk preference based on risk-taking logic, the company will have a bet- ter future performance. The conclusion of this study provides important implications for the design of in- centive contracts.

关 键 词：限制性股票 股票期权 风险态度 股权激励机制 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]