基于税收的企业水污染治理制度设计  

Institution Design for Governing Pollution Discharge of Enterprise Based on Tax

作　　者：孙绍荣[1] 孙蕾 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093 [2]上海商学院商务经济学院,上海200235

出　　处：《系统工程》2017年第7期58-62,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771151;71171134);上海市教委科研创新重点项目(11ZS138);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2011BGL006);上海市一流学科建设项目(S1201YLXK);沪江基金资助项目(A14006)

摘　　要：本文从制度设计的角度论证了控制企业努力水平与税率的关系。以水污染治理研究为例将成本公摊制度应用其中,建立了基于税收的制度改进模型,推导出了水污染型企业在群体效用最大与个体效用最大下的努力水平均衡点,及个体企业与企业集体同时满足效用最大化时最佳税率应满足的条件。研究表明当水污染型企业最佳努力水平的均衡点偏离区域内企业集体效用最大时企业个体的努力水平均衡点时,企业集体利益与个体企业利益都会受损,区域内水污染型企业数量越多时,税率也必须增大,才可使个体企业行为均衡点与企业集体收益最大的均衡点一致。此时税收起到了调节水污染型企业的生产速度而使水资源得到一定的保护。本文也为治理水污染型企业提供决策支持与制度参考。In this paper, the relationship between the control enterprise effort level and the tax rate are demonstrated from the perspective of institution design and cost allocation institution is used to water pollution governance in perspective of institution design. By establishing an improved model of cost allocation based on tax deduced two equilibrium points of efforts level under the group utility maximum and individual utility maximum, we get the optimize tax condition when individual enterprise and enterprise group at the same time satisfy the utility maximization. Research shows that when the equilibrium point of optimal effort level of water pollution enterprises deviated from the collective enterprise utility maximum equilibrium levels of individual efforts, both collective enterprise interests and individual interests will be damaged. In a certain area the more inland waters polluting enterprises, the tax rate must also increase, which can make the individual enterprise behavior equilibrium equal to equilibrium of collective enterprise behavior in condition of maximum utility. At this time tax plays a role to adjust production speed of enterprise and make the water resource to get some proteclion. This paper also provides decision support and institution reference for governance of water pollution enterprises.

关 键 词：成本公摊 税收 排污治理 制度设计 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]