偏好结构、过度自信与代理人可变薪酬契约选择行为:基于真实任务的实验研究  

Preference Structure,Overconfidence and Variable Compensation Contract Choice Behavior of Agent:Experimental Study Based on Real Tasks

作　　者：李建标[1,2] 付晓改 任广乾[3] 李朝阳 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [3]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001 [4]河南工业大学管理学院,河南郑州450001

出　　处：《预测》2018年第1期15-21,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71602051;71673152;71702171);国家社会科学基金资助项目(16BJY035);河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究一般资助项目(2017-ZZJH-089);河南省高等学校重点科研资助项目(17A630014)

摘　　要：代理人的行为特征是影响薪酬契约效率的重要因素,契约设计时需要满足个体的隐性心理偏好与显性激励制度的要求。本文从个体的偏好结构和信念特征出发,通过真实任务的实验方法探究个体行为特质与薪酬契约的匹配规律。研究结果表明,风险偏好、过度自信、落后厌恶与竞争偏好都显著影响代理人的薪酬契约选择行为;分别进行中介效应检验时发现,竞争偏好在风险偏好与可变薪酬契约选择行为之间存在部分中介效应,竞争偏好在过度自信与可变薪酬契约选择行为之间存在完全中介效应。研究结果有助于了解代理人在不同激励层次上的心理成本与行为基础,对企业降低雇佣成本以及雇员薪酬契约选择等方面均有重要的参考价值。Agents' behavioral characteristics is the key factor which influence efficiency of compensation contracts,contract design need to meet the individual invisible mental preference and explicit incentive system. From the individual's preference structure and beliefs characteristics,this study explores the matching rule between individual behavior characteristics and compensation contracts through the experimental method of real tasks. The results show that,risk appetite,overconfidence,behindness aversion and competition preference have obvious influence on the compensation contracts choice behavior of agent; The mediation effect inspection finds that competition preference plays a partial mediation role in the relation between risk appetite and variable compensation contracts choice behavior,that competition preference in the relation between overconfidence and variable compensation contracts choice behavior exists completely mediating effect.The results help to understand agents 'psychological cost and behavior in different incentive level,and have important reference value for the enterprise to reduce the cost of hiring and employee compensation contracts choice,etc.

关 键 词：可变薪酬契约选择 偏好结构 信念特征 真实任务 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]