外部冲击视角下的CEO薪酬研究:个体揩油还是集体辩护  

Skimming or Justifying: A Study on CEO Compensation in Chinese Listed Companies from the Perspective of External Shock

作　　者：杨青[1] 陈峰[1] 龚懿婷 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《广东财经大学学报》2018年第1期99-112,共14页Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373049)

摘　　要：上市公司CEO薪酬与公司业绩长期背离、居高不下,这是监管失效还是市场失灵?基于CEO最优薪酬模型,采用2sls方法对2005年~2016年中国上市公司大样本面板数据进行实证研究,发现上市公司存在幸运薪酬和同业薪酬两种外部冲击,个体揩油和集体辩护现象同时存在,且集体辩护行为比个体揩油现象对CEO高薪现象更具解释力;由经理人市场竞争导致的集体辩护扩大效应对CEO薪酬有放大作用;考察股权特征和监管政策的作用,国有企业高管薪酬仅在集体辩护冲击程度方面有显著差异,且其对薪酬约束政策反应显著。该结论支持2014年之后新一轮薪酬调控改革的市场导向政策,上市公司CEO薪酬设计的合理性问题应通过有效监管的市场竞争来解决。CEO compensation has been high and departing from the earning performance of the company.Is this the failure of supervision or the disfunction of the market？ Based on the optimal CEO compensation model,this paper tests the panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2016 by two stage least square（ 2 sls） and finds out： luck pay and peer pay are the two external shocks that both influence the CEO compensation,and there are both skimming and justifying effects,in which the influence of the latter is stronger; justifying effect induced by the peer pay effect of competitive market exaggerates the increasing of CEO compensation. By considering equity ownership and government regulation,the paper finds significant difference only in the cases of external shock of justifying,and the policy of compensation constraint. The conclusion supports the market-oriented policy for the new compensation reform since 2014. The rationality of the CEO compensation in the listed company should be resolved through the effective supervision of market competition.

关 键 词：CEO薪酬 个体揩油 集体辩护 幸运薪酬 同业薪酬 公司业绩 

分 类 号：F244[经济管理—劳动经济]