晋升激励影响并购价值创造吗?——来自国有控股企业的经验证据  

Do Promotion Incentives Affect M&A Value Creation?——Empirical Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises

作　　者：赵妍[1] 赵立彬 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044 [2]武汉纺织大学会计学院,湖北武汉430200

出　　处：《经济经纬》2018年第2期158-164,共7页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71402130)

摘　　要：以2006—2013年A股国有控股上市公司数据,实证考察了国有企业高管政治晋升激励与并购价值创造之间的关系。实证结果显示,基于政治晋升激励而发动的并购容易导致公司价值毁损。该结果表明,现有国企负责人晋升考核机制容易诱发企业负责人机会主义行为,不利于公司长远发展。研究扩展了政治晋升的研究对象,从以往的政府官员个人拓展到微观企业,也将职业生涯与公司价值相关研究由西方市场化的职业经理人市场拓宽至中国式特色的政府管制的国企高管市场。Taking state-owned A-share listed enterprises between 2006 and 2013 as samples, this paper examines the relationship between political promotion of executives in these enterprises and value creation through M＆A. The results show that M＆A activities which are initiated out of political career concerns reduce corporate value. This means the present promotion assessment mechanism in state-owned enterprises is likely to lead to speculation of executives and thus is harmful for the long-term development of enterprises. This study expands both the object and scope of research. In terms of political promotion, it includes not only government officials but also micro enterprises. In terms of career and corporate value, it goes beyond professional manager market in the west to the SOE executives market in China with characteristics of government regulation.

关 键 词：政治晋升 职业生涯 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F271.4[经济管理—国民经济]