证监会处罚、分析师跟踪与公司银行债务融资——来自信息披露违规的经验证据  

The CSRC Punishment,Analyst Following and Corporate Bank Debt Financing——Empirical Evidence from Information Disclosure Violations

作　　者：刘星[1] 陈西婵[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400030 [2]重庆工商大学融智学院,400030

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第1期60-67,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(71232004);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71172082);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(NO.2017CDJSK02PT01)的资助

摘　　要：证监会处罚公告释放的"坏消息"具有风险预警的作用,可能导致违规公司银行债务融资下降。分析师跟踪可能具有信息效应和声誉效应,影响证监会处罚公告与公司银行债务融资之间的关系。在中国资本市场强化监管的背景下,本文考察了证监会处罚对于违规公司非公开市场融资的经济后果。我们的研究发现,证监会处罚公告后,违规公司的银行贷款签约概率、银行贷款签约率和新增银行贷款规模均下降;并且,处罚等级越高,下降越显著。银行预期违规公司的信息成本与违约风险上升,而非公司真实的财务状况恶化是公司银行债务融资下降的主要原因。此外,分析师跟踪的信息效应而非声誉效应,缓解了证监会处罚公告与公司银行债务融资之间的负向关系。本文拓展了资本市场处罚和分析师跟踪对于公司非公开市场融资的经济后果研究,也为新兴市场国家的资本市场监管提供了经验证据。The bad news of the sudden release of punishment announcement by the CSRC （China Securities Regulatory Commission） has the func- tion of risk early warning, which may lead to the decline of corporate bank debt financing. Analyst following has information effect and reputation effect, which may affect the relationship between the CSRC punishment announcement and corporate bank debt financing. In the context of strengthening capital market supervision, this paper investigated the economic consequences of the CSRC punishment announcement on the corporate non-public market finan- cing. Our study found that after the CSRC punishment announcement, the bank loan signing probability, the bank loan signing rate and the new bank loan scale of the violated firms were all fell. Also with the punishment level rose, the violated firm＇s bank debt financing decline was more significant. Further more, we found that the banks expected the information costs and default risk to increase, rather than the company＇s real financial deterioration was the main reason. In addition, that is the information effect, rather than the reputation effect of the analyst following, which alleviated the negative relationship between the CSRC punishment announcement and corporate bank debt financing. This paper expands the research that the economic conse- quences of the capital market punishment and analyst following on the company non-public market financing. It also provides empirical evidence for the e- merging market countries capital market regulation.

关 键 词：证券监管 分析师跟踪 银行债务融资 信息效应 声誉效应 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]