国企高管薪酬管制效率分析——一个基于信息租金的分析框架  

The Efficiency of Compensation Regulation in SOEs——A Framework Based on Information Rent

作　　者：徐玉德 张昉 Xu Yude;Zhang Fang

机构地区：[1]中国财政科学研究院,100142 [2]中国农业银行,100005

出　　处：《会计研究》2018年第5期44-51,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(17CGL062)资助

摘　　要：本文以信息租金作为薪酬激励成本的替代变量,以2005-2014年上市公司数据为样本,考察了政治动机与高管超额薪酬之间的关系及其对薪酬管制效率的影响。结果表明,国企高管薪酬的业绩敏感性较低,并且受政治动机影响容易获得更多超额薪酬。用员工平均薪酬倍数来限定国企高管薪酬上限可以在一定程度上减少超额薪酬,但是政治动机弱化管制的效率。上述研究显示,"一刀切"实施酬管制只能作为现行体制下的权宜之计,明确国企高管身份以使隐性的激励成本和收益显性化,同时加强竞争性市场建设才有助于从根本上解决国企经理人激励不相容问题。Using compensation regulation based on the information rent as substitution variables of salary incentive cost, taking the data of listed companies from 2005 to 2014 as a sample, we investigated the relationship between political motivation and excessive executive compensation and its in- fluence on the efficiency of compensation control. The results show that the performance sensitivity of executive compensation is low, and it is easy to get more excessive compensation due to political motivation. It can reduce the excess compensation by using the upper salary cap of limit the multiple times of employees＇ average salary, but the political motivation weakens the efficiency of regulation. The study shows that ＂one size fits all＂ compensation con- trol can only be used as a temporary measure under the current system, only by clearly stating executive identity and making the hidden incentive costs and benefits obvious, by the meantime, enhancing the construction of a competitive market can help fundamentally solving the problem of state-owned enterprise managers incentive incompatibility.

关 键 词：薪酬管制 超额薪酬 信息租金 政治动机 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F276.1[经济管理—国民经济]