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作 者:赵黎明[1] 孙健慧[1] 张海波[1,2] ZHAO Li-ming;SUN Jian-hui;ZHANG Hai-bo(School of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China;Luneng Group Company Limited,Beijing 100020,China)
机构地区:[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]鲁能集团有限公司,北京100020
出 处:《管理工程学报》2018年第3期105-111,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助重大项目(13&ZD162);国家软科学研究计划资助项目(2011GXQ4B008)
摘 要:运用微分对策理论研究了单一制造商和单一零售商组成的二级低碳产品供应链营销合作问题。在考虑低碳商誉对收益影响的基础上,分别考察了低碳产品制造商和零售商在Nash非合作博弈、Stackelberg博弈与协同合作博弈三种情形下的最优营销策略,并比较分析了反馈均衡结果。研究结果表明,相对非合作模式,协同合作模式下的供应链整体收益和参与双方的营销策略最优。基于此,进一步讨论了参与双方个体收益帕累托最优条件下供应链整体收益分配系数的取值范围,给出了低碳产品供应链营销合作行为的协调机制。最后,通过算例分析验证了模型结论。International society has a consensus to reduce carbon emissions and promote the development of low carbon economy in order to face the challenges of climate change. Achieving these goals depends not only on the production of low carbonization, but also on the consumption of low carbonization. The marketing strategy choice of enterprises is often greatly influenced by consumers' preference to low-carbon products. Facing the unknown consumer preference to low-carbon products, there is a great sense of marketing collaboration for manufacturers and retailers. Thus, the research on the marketing collaboration of low-carbon product supply chain has great realistic significance. In a low-carbon economy, some studies tried to resolve the optimization problems for the upstream supply chain in terms of production and operation. However, those studies were rarely able to do so from the perspective of marketing low-carbon products. Considering the impact of low-carbon goodwill on profit, this paper tries to explore the long-term marketing cooperation problem of the low-carbon product supply chain system consisted of a single manufacturer and a single retailer by using differential games. This study investigates the optimal marketing strategies of the manufacturer and retailer by adapting to the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg leader-follower game and coordinated cooperative game, respectively. Subsequently, the equilibrium outcomes in the three game structures are comparatively analyzed. This study further discusses the dynamic coordination mechanism of low-carbon product supply chain marketing cooperation. This study aims to promote low-carbon consumption and reduce carbon emissions by optimizing the marketing decision mechanism. The first section proposes hypotheses and a general description of our proposed model. In the second section, considering the impact of low-carbon goodwill on profit, differential game models of the manufacturer and retailer are built respectively in the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackel
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