当代英美认识论的困境及出路--基于默会知识维度  

The Predicament of Contemporary Anglo-American Epistemology and Its Way Out—Based on the Dimension of Tacit Knowledge

作　　者：郁振华[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学哲学系、中国现代思想文化研究所,上海200241

出　　处：《中国社会科学》2018年第7期22-40,共19页Social Sciences in China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(15ZDB012); 教育部人文社会科学基地重大项目(16JJD720005)阶段性成果

摘　　要：默会知识概念具有丰富的理论意蕴,牵涉人类知识问题的多重概念关系,挑战了西方哲学传统中多种根深蒂固的教条或成见,为我们考察人类知识问题提供了全新视角。围绕默会知识及相关问题,近年在英美出现了三种影响较大的进路:科学知识社会学的进路、分析认识论的进路和社会科学哲学的进路,它们突出了内在视角和外在视角之分、个体取向和集体取向之分与强默会知识和弱默会知识之分。一种拓展性的认识论研究主张采取内在视角、认同个体取向、坚持维特根斯坦派对强弱默会知识的区分,并主张亲知和能力之知是强默会知识的两种基本形态。这一立场不仅彰显了拘执于命题性知识的英美流行认识论的缺陷,而且为建构一种厚实的认识论打下了基础。The concept of tacit knowledge has rich theoretical implications involving the multiple conceptual relationships of human knowledge and challenging many deeply rooted dogmas or prejudices in the Western philosophical tradition,providing a new perspective for examination of the issue of human knowledge.Three influential approaches in Britain and America in recent years have revolved around tacit knowledge and related issues:the sociology of scientific knowledge,analytical epistemology and the philosophy of social sciences.These highlight the distinction between internal and external perspectives,between individual and collective orientations, and between strong and weak tacit knowledge. Expanding epistemological research proposes adopting an intrinsic perspective,identifying individual orientations,and adhering to Wittgenstein's distinction between strong and weak tacit knowledge,and argues that personal knowledge and"know-how"are the two basic forms of strong tacit knowledge.This standpoint not only highlights the shortcomings of British and American epistemology with its obstinate adherence to propositional knowledge, but also lays the foundation for building a solid epistemology.

关 键 词：默会知识 能力之知 亲知 

分 类 号：B023[哲学宗教—哲学理论]