郭象独化说新解——兼与维特根斯坦的相关观点比较  

A New Interpretation of Guo Xiang's Self-transformation Theory——Compared with Some Ideas of Wittgenstein

作　　者：韩林合[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系暨外国哲学研究所

出　　处：《文史哲》2018年第4期50-60,共11页Literature,History,and Philosophy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"‘人是遵守规则的动物’之论题研究"(15AZX017);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"规范性研究"(16JJD720003)的阶段性成果

摘　　要："独化"说是郭象哲学体系的基础。通过借鉴维特根斯坦的对象理论及其区分原因和理由的学说,可以澄清和解决围绕着该学说的众多疑难问题,特别是独化与相因和有待逍遥之间的复杂关系问题。与维特根斯坦相似,郭象似乎也区分了原因和理由,认为事物之生成和变化无原因,但有理由。一个事物之生成和变化的理由,即与其有着非依赖的协变关系的诸事物,更准确地说,即其性分或理分。并且,天地万物之生成和变化的理由链条是有终结的,其终点便是所谓至理,即这样的道理:天地万物均是自然而然的,或者说均是不知其所以然而自然的。Self-transformation theory is the foundation of Guo Xiang's philosophy.This paper is to clarify and solve some puzzles about this theory, in particular that related to the relations among self-transformation, Xiangyin and Xiaoyao with independence.The author tries to do this with the help of Wittgenstein's theories about object and the distinction of cause and reason.Like Wittgenstein, Guo Xiang seems also distinguish between cause and reason, claiming that the genesis and change of things have reason, but not cause.The reason why a thing is generated and changed is those things which have non-dependent covariant relations with it, that is, its essence.And the chain of reasons of genesis and change of things has end, which is the ultimate principle that all the things in the world are self-so, or they don't know at all why they are so and so.

关 键 词：独化 相因 因果关系 协变关系 理由 

分 类 号：B235.6[哲学宗教—中国哲学] B561.59