高管激励,终极控制权性质与财务风险  

Executive Incentives,the Nature of Ultimate Control and Financial Risk

作　　者：陈丹 曹伟豪 Chen Dan;Cao Weihao(College of Accounting,Changchun University of Finance and Economics,Changchun 130122,China;College of Accounting,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)

机构地区：[1]长春财经学院会计学院,长春130122 [2]西南财经大学会计学院,成都611130

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2018年第9期114-122,共9页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

摘　　要：基于供给侧结构性改革企业"去杠杆"的大背景,本文以我国煤炭等财务风险较高的行业2013~2017年数据为样本,探究高管激励与财务风险之间的关系以及终极控制权性质对此关系的调节作用。研究发现:薪酬激励与资产负债率呈"正U型"的非线性关系,能在一定范围内部分降低财务风险;而股权激励与资产负债率和财务杠杆系数均呈负相关的线性关系,能够全面降低财务风险;国有终极控制权会弱化薪酬激励与资产负债率之间的"正U型"关系,非国有控制企业薪酬激励降低财务风险的效果略优于国有控制企业。Based on the large background of the ＂deleveraging＂of the supply side structural reform,this paper uses the2013 ~ 2017 data of China’ s coal and other industries with high financial risks as a sample to explore the relationship between executive incentives and financial risks and the role of the ultimate control rights in regulating the relationship. The study finds that salary incentives and asset-liability ratios have a ＂positive U-shaped＂ relationship,and can partially reduce financial risks within a certain range; and equity incentive is negatively related to asset liability ratio and financial leverage coefficient,which can reduce the overall financial risk; the state-owned ultimate control power will weaken the ＂positive U-shaped＂ relationship between salary incentives and asset-liability ratio. Salary incentives to reduce financial risk are slightly better in non-state-owned company than state-controlled enterprises.

关 键 词：高管激励 终极控制权性质 财务风险 去杠杆 薪酬激励 资产负债率 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]