休谟因果决定论图景下的道德情感主义立场  

Hume's Moral Sentimentalism Position Under Causal Picture

作　　者：张燕 ZHANG Yan(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100872)

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2018年第3期37-43,共7页Science Economy Society

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)关于"同情"的利他主义辩护(17XNH118)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：休谟的伦理学是在科学语境下仍然有效存在的伦理学形式之一。他将理性从因果关系的核心位置中剔除出去,成为他在"是——应当"问题中将道德价值赋予情感的理论基础。他实现了理性观察方法与理性工具化的并存,也在因果决定论和道德规范的约束力中达成了兼容。通常被他人看作理性产物的正义规则和正义感在休谟理论中以演化论的模型得到解释,成为因果理论和情感主义的示例。本文将致力于呈现休谟的因果决定论与情感主义主张的相互呼应,打通休谟思想内部的逻辑。Hume’s Ethics is one of the effective forms of ethics under the science context. He expelled reason from the core position of causality, which constituted the theoretical foundation of his claim that moral values are derived from feelings in “is-ought” problem. He realized the coexistence of observational method of reason and instrumental reason, and arrives at the compatibility between causal determinism and moral norms’ restraints. Rules of justice and sense of justice are usually regarded as products of reason by others, but in Hume’s theory, explained in evolution theory, they became the instances of causal theory and sentimentalism. This paper aims to show that Hume’s causal determinism and sentimentalism correspond to each other and therefore build the internal logic of Hume’s thoughts.

关 键 词：休谟 因果关系 情感主义 道德感 正义 

分 类 号：F403[经济管理—产业经济]