风险资本对企业代理成本的影响:公司治理的视角  

Impact of Venture Capital on Agency Cost of Firms:A Corporate Governance Perspective

作　　者：彭涛 黄福广[2] 李少育[3] PENG Tao;HUANG Fuguang;LI Shaoyu(International School Business ＆ Finance, Sun Yat-sun University, Zhuhai 519082, China;Business School, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;Securities and Futures College, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China)

机构地区：[1]中山大学国际金融学院,广东珠海519082 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [3]西南财经大学证券与期货学院,成都611130

出　　处：《管理科学》2018年第4期62-78,共17页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71702203);高校科研基本业务费青年培育项目(17wkpy32)~~

摘　　要：由于信息不对称和不确定性程度更高,通常创业型中小企业的代理成本更严重。风险资本作为创业企业的主要股权投资者,区别于其他类型机构投资者,积极参与被投资企业公司治理,对公司创始人大股东和管理层实施监督和激励,为保护其自身利益,风险资本有能力和动机缓解代理冲突。基于信息不对称理论和委托代理理论,通过分析风险资本的双重治理角色,从公司治理视角考察风险资本对企业两类代理成本的影响。以2004年至2013年中小板和创业板上市企业为研究样本,形成一个非平衡面板数据。利用多元回归方法中的固定效应模型,检验风险资本利用公司治理机制降低企业代理成本的有效性,并进一步考察家族企业对风险资本影响企业代理成本的调节效应。研究结果表明,(1)依据两类代理成本测量,风险资本支持的企业代理成本更低。(2)风险资本通过持有股份比例和董事会席位比例降低代理成本。(3)创业家族企业调节风险资本对代理成本的影响,风险资本深度参与非家族企业公司治理,对代理成本的降低作用更加明显。(4)采取更换代理成本测量指标和区分风险资本与私募股权等方式进行稳健性检验,上述结果依然成立;利用工具变量法、Heckman两阶段和双重差分方法克服潜在的内生性问题,结论保持不变。基于风险资本投资于创业企业的特点,分析代理成本的表现形式,论证风险资本对企业可能产生的两类代理成本的影响机制,发现风险资本可以有效监督创始人和职业经理人,研究结果对风险资本如何控制代理成本以及上市企业如何优化治理结构具有参考意义。Due to the high degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty, the agency cost of small and medium-sized enterprises is more serious. Distinct from other institutional investors, venture capital mainly invest funds in small and medium-sized enterprises and are actively involved in the corporate governance of portfolio firms. In order to protect investment interests, venture capital monitor and motivate founders and managers of the portfolio firms. Therefore, venture capital have abilities and incentives to mitigate agency cost. Based on information asymmetry theory and principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the dual governance role of venture capital in the portfolio firms, and investigates effects of venture capital on the two kinds of agency cost of the portfolio firms from a perspective of corporate governance. Using firms going public from the year 2004 to 2013 on the small and medium-sized enterprise board and growth enterprise market as an sample, we collected a unbalanced panel data set by hand. A fixed effect model in the multiple regression method is used to examine the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms of venture capital in mitigating agency cost. Then, we further examine whether family firms play a moderating role in the relationship between venture capital and agency cost of the portfolio firms. Firstly, venture capital-backed firms have significantly lower agency cost I between outside shareholders and managers, and lower agency cost Ⅱ between minority shareholders and large shareholders. Secondly, venture capital＇ shareholding and board seats are significantly negatively associated with dual agency cost. Lastly, family firms play a moderating role between venture capital financing and agency cost. venture capital are more actively involved in the corporate governance of non-family firms, and the negative relationship between venture capital financing and agency cost is more pronounced in non-family firms. Finally, the robustness test is carried out by replacing the agency c

关 键 词：风险资本 代理成本 公司治理 家族企业 创业企业 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]