机构投资者异质性与高管薪酬  

Institutional Investors' Heterogeneity and Executive Compensation

作　　者：李争光[1] 年洁 李萍[1] 高天羽 LI Zheng-guang;NIAN Jie;LI Ping;GAO Tian-yu

机构地区：[1]盐城工学院经济管理学院,江苏盐城224051 [2]河海大学常州校区企业管理学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《财务研究》2018年第5期55-68,共14页Finance Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602053);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2015SJB763)

摘　　要：高管薪酬已经成为学术界和实务界关注的热点。本文以我国2001～2014年的A股上市公司作为研究对象,借鉴已有的研究将机构投资者划分为交易型与稳定型,在此基础上,从异质机构视角考察了机构投资者对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现,与交易型机构投资者相比,稳定型机构投资者提高了高管薪酬整体水平和高管薪酬业绩敏感性。本文的研究结论表明稳定型机构投资者促进了高管薪酬契约的有效履行。The executive compensation has become the popular topics for academics and practitioners. In this paper, we use the sample data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies between 2001 and 2014, dividing institutional investors into stable institutional investors and unstable institutional investors based on existing literature, exploring the relationship between institutional investors＇ heterogeneity and executive compensation. Empirical evidence shows that stable institutional investors positively associate with the level of executive compensation and pay-performance sensitivity compared with unstable institutional investors. The findings of this paper also indicate that stable institutional investors help to effectively implement executive compensation contract.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 高管薪酬业绩敏感性 机构投资者异质性 交易型机构投资者 稳定型机构投资者 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]