基于时间差异的员工薪酬决定博弈分析  

Game Analysis on the Establishment of Employee’s Compensation from the Perspective of Time Difference

作　　者：姚佩怡[1] 姚正海 YAO Pei-yi;YAO Zheng-hai(School of Economics,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433;School of Business,Jiangsu Normal University,Xuzhou 221116)

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433 [2]江苏师范大学商学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《软科学》2018年第10期58-61,79,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BJY111)

摘　　要：从企业较为关注的薪酬制度制定角度出发,将员工是否具有时间一致性划分为耐心和不耐心型两组进行对照,设定固定工资和激励计划两种薪酬形式,通过建立信号博弈模型,求解出劳动力市场上企业与员工之间所达到的贝叶斯均衡。研究表明：如果从企业实际支付角度出发制定薪酬政策,将会达成一个分离均衡和一个混同均衡;如果从员工实际感知角度出发制定,将会仅达成一个混同均衡。This article focuses on the most attention-grabbing topic among enterprises--the establishment of compensation system,divides the employees into two types who are either patient or impatient depending on time consistency,considering two types of compensations--fixed salary and floating salary,and makes comparison between these two. By constructing a signaling game model,it gets the solution of Bayesian equilibrium between enterprises and employees in labor market. Result shows that there is a separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium when making compensation policy based on enterprises＇ actual pay while there is only a pooling equilibrium when making compensation policy based on employees＇ actual perception.

关 键 词：薪酬制度 信号博弈 时间一致性 分离均衡 混同均衡 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]