分析师关注、高管薪酬激励与真实盈余管理  

Analyst Coverage,Executive Compensation Incentives and Real Earnings Management

作　　者：舒少文 Shu Shaowen(School of Finance,Zhongnan University of Economics and Law,Wuhan 430073,China)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》2018年第5期20-27,81,共9页Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：2017年中南财经政法大学研究生科研创新项目“公司治理、企业社会责任与盈余管理——基于A股上市公司的证据”(编号:201710530)

摘　　要：利用Pooled OLS和Fama-MacBeth方法,对2013-2017年我国A股非金融上市公司的数据进行分析,并进行了内生性检验,考察分析师关注和高管的薪酬激励对企业真实盈余管理的影响,随后按照企业规模和性质对样本进行划分。得到结论如下：分析师关注能显著促进企业真实盈余操作,而薪酬激励能够显著抑制企业的真实盈余管理;薪酬激励能够显著缓解分析师关注对真实盈余管理的诱发作用;薪酬激励对缓解分析师关注对真实盈余管理诱发作用在小企业和非国企表现更为显著。This paper uses the Pooled OLS and Fama-MacBeth methods to analyze the data of Chinese A-share non-financial listed companies from 2013 to 2017,and conducts an endogenous test to examine the impact of analysts＇ concern on the real earnings management（ RM）. The sample is then divided according to the size and nature of the company. The conclusions are as follows： analysts＇ attention can significantly promote the RM,and salary incentives can significantly inhibit the RM; salary incentives can significantly alleviate the incentive effect of analysts on RM; the evoked effect on RM is more pronounced in small and non-state enterprises.

关 键 词：分析师关注 高管薪酬激励 真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]