CEO权力与个股价格崩盘风险  

CEO Power and Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：林雯 曾爱民[1] LIN Wen;ZENG Ai-Min

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学财务与会计学院,杭州310018

出　　处：《财务研究》2018年第6期66-78,共13页Finance Research

基　　金：教育部规划基金项目(18YJA630004;15YJA630093);浙江省自然科学基金面上项目(LY15G020002);国家自然科学基金项目(71572165;71502166;71272011);国家社会科学基金重点项目(13AGL002);浙江省高校人文社会科学重点研究基地(浙江工商大学工商管理学科)重点项目(JYTgs20151301)

摘　　要：本文基于公司内部治理结构的视角度量CEO权力,实证考察了CEO权力对公司个股价格崩盘风险的影响。实证结果显示,CEO权力与上市公司个股价格崩盘风险显著正相关,说明当上市公司CEO拥有过大权力时会加剧个股价格崩盘风险。进一步从投资者保护和产品市场竞争双重视角探究相关外部治理因素的影响发现,投资者保护水平的提高以及产品市场竞争程度的加剧都能发挥外部治理作用,显著降低CEO权力过大对公司股价崩盘风险的负面影响。本文的研究丰富了股价崩盘风险影响因素的理论,对完善公司内外部治理具有一定的实践指导意义。This paper measures CEO power based on the company＇s internal governance structure, and empirically examines the influence of CEO power on the risk of stock price crash. The empirical results show that CEO power is positively correlated with the risk of stock price crash. Moreover, we explore external governance factors from the perspective of investor protection and product market competition. We find that the improvement of investor protection and the aggravation of product market competition can significantly reduce the risk of stock price crash caused by too powerful CEO. This paper enriches the theoretical and empirical research of the factors of stock price crash risk, and has practical guiding significance for improving the internal and external governance of company.

关 键 词：个股价格崩盘风险 CEO权力 投资者保护 产品市场竞争 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F830.91[经济管理—国民经济]