教师教育课程改革的困境及其突围——基于委托—代理理论的分析  

The Dilemma and Solution to the Curriculum Reform of Teacher Education——An Analysis Based on Principal-agency Theory

作　　者：杨跃[1] YANG Yue(School of Teacher Education,Nanjing Normal University,Nanjing,Jiangsu 210097,China)

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学教师教育学院,江苏南京210097

出　　处：《湖南师范大学教育科学学报》2017年第2期6-12,共7页Journal of Educational Science of Hunan Normal University

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点研究基地重大项目"社会学视野下的中国教育改革研究";教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"教师教育治理结构与机制的国际比较与本土建构"[15YJA880093]

摘　　要：在委托—代理理论视野中,我国教师教育课程管理涉及多层级委托—代理关系链,各级委托人和代理人之间目标不一致与信息不对称带来的逆向选择、道德风险等直接危及课程质量,课程改革也因此陷入困境之中。教师教育课程治理的关键在于构建有效激励机制,包括优化政府对高校教师教育的激励、强化高校对二级学院教师教育的激励、完善校院两级对教师教学工作的激励以及积极发挥社会中介组织及公众对政府、高校的监督与约束作用。From the perspective of principal-agency theory,there are multi-layer principal-agent chains referring to the curriculum reform of teacher education.It is the adverse selection and moral hazard caused by the inconsistent goals and asymmetric information between the principal and agent that directly endanger the curriculum quality and make the curriculum reform in trouble.The key of the curriculum governance of teacher education is to design an effective incentive mechanism to encourage universities,its secondary colleges and all the teachers to take teaching seriously,and to encourage the social intermediary organizations and the public to play the role of supervision and restraint on government and university actively.

关 键 词：教师教育课程改革 委托-代理关系 逆向选择 道德风险 激励机制 

分 类 号：G423.07[文化科学—课程与教学论]