股权激励能阻止创业板高管辞职与套现吗?  

Can Equity Incentives Prevent Executives on ChiNext from Resigning and Cashing Out?

作　　者：冯怡恬[1] 杨柳勇[1] FENG Yi-tian;YANG Liu-yong(School of Economics,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310027,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2018年第3期36-46,共11页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(15JJD790030)

摘　　要：文章针对创业板高管辞职与套现这一市场关注的焦点问题,探究股权激励能否留住高管、缓解高管减持套现。以手工收集2009年至2016年创业板上市公司6347位高管个人数据为样本,实证研究发现:股权激励能显著降低创业板高管辞职的可能性,但会显著加剧高管的减持,进一步研究显示激励强度与高管持股变动的可能性和比例均呈U型关系;其中限制性股票激励方式对高管辞职、套现均有显著影响,而股票期权激励方式影响不显著。研究为创业板上市公司多角度认识股权激励效果提供了经验证据,为其制定激励方案提供了参考建议。Based on the focus of the resignation and cash-out of executives on ChiNext,this paper mainly studies whether equity incentives can retain executives and stop them from selling their shares.We use a hand-collected sample of 6347 ChiNext executives from 2009 to 2016 to conduct our empirical analysis.The results indicate that:(1)Equity incentives can significantly reduce the possibility of executive resignation,but will significantly aggravate their equity cash-out.Further study shows a U-shaped relationship between executives incentives and their shareholding changes.(2)As for different kinds of incentives,restricted stocks have a significant effect on executives resignation and cash-out,while stock options do not.This paper provides the listed companies on ChiNext with empirical evidence to fully understand the effect of equity incentives,and with suggestions for drafting equity incentive plans.

关 键 词：股权激励 高管辞职 高管减持 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]